security

Why this preview is unsigned on purpose (and what would change if it weren't)

Publisher certificates cost money, custody discipline, and contractual identity. The preview's deal: you get the SHA-256 for every candidate, publicly, before install.

ProofTune Project··4 min read
Security & trust illustration Security & trust

The uncomfortable economics

A code-signing certificate from a public CA is a time-boxed identity with hardware-key custody and renewal cycles. On a preview cadence — rebuilds daily, re-issues often — teams that sign anyway either ship with test certificates (destroys the chain-of-trust idea) or delay builds while cert ops catch up. The coherent alternative: keep the preview unsigned, make the hash the handshake.

The protocol we run

  1. Every candidate MSI emits with a manifest JSON naming the exact SHA-256, build gate results, and payload inventory.
  2. The landing page restates the hash with a Copy button so comparisons are copy-paste, not transcription.
  3. Your side: (Get-FileHash …).Hash, paste-match, irreconcilable = discard. No “looks fine.”

What changes at public release

Signing arrives with the first public version. UpgradeCodes remain stable so preview builds upgrade into signed releases cleanly; the signature verification story changes, your files don't. The trust lecture you exercised on the preview isn't wasted — it's the same hash discipline many teams keep even when signed, when validating mirrors.

ProofTune ProjectEngineering notes — every claim here names the bytes a real tool touches. Verify first, install second.
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See these exact settings inside the real tool

The browser replica runs the same strings and states as the installed app — click around before you ever install anything.