preview-process

Candidate, preview, signed release: the trust ladder, climbed deliberately

'Candidate' is an artifact that may become a release iff gates pass. The ladder exists so that every level of trust is earned — by tests, or by the signature someone pays for.

ProofTune Project··4 min read
Preview process illustration Preview process

The three rungs

candidate
built, hashed, gate-checked, unsigned — trust = proof artifacts (manifest + gates)
preview
published to evaluators — trust = hash verify by user + documented scope
release
signed with a real certificate — trust = publisher identity from CA + everything above

Why the middle level exists at all

Signing an early build puts reputation behind bytes that haven't proven their safety model in the wild — a bankruptcy of the assurance you were buying with that certificate. The unsigned-preview window is where even a security-conscious solo user can develop the verify reflex (hash first, features later) at zero reduction of their safety posture.

Signals of a mature ladder

  • Every candidate logs its gate results beside the artifact, not in a promise;
  • UpgradeCodes stable across preview → release so your evaluation setup lifts cleanly;
  • Downgrades are rejected explicitly with a message, not silent “won't overwrite” — refusal logged is a feature of installers, not a bug;
  • VM gates: the tool is installed/repaired/upgraded/uninstalled in a throwaway image before a human is offered it.

This preview sits at rung two, publishing everything rung three will use. The ladder script propagates upward: package manifest → hashes → signing. Every public statement about it is constraint-verified before it ships.

ProofTune ProjectEngineering notes — every claim here names the bytes a real tool touches. Verify first, install second.
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See these exact settings inside the real tool

The browser replica runs the same strings and states as the installed app — click around before you ever install anything.